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There is something eerily reminiscent of very ancient religions in current mainstream 
South African economic discussion. 
It centres not on what is good for 
the country but on what is needed 
to appease an unseen force which is 
meant to be all powerful unless it is 
obeyed without question. The force 
in question is the dreaded ratings 
agencies, those all-powerful economic 
arbiters of good and evil with the power 
to decree whether economies live or 
die. Their instrument of punishment, 
of course, is junk status, whose victims 
are banished to the hopeless eternity of 
economic despair.
Our current economic debate, 
therefore, is less of an exchange 
of views than it might appear. In 
the mainstream, it consists purely 
of a discussion of what is needed 
to appease the-ratings-agencies-
who-must-be-obeyed and of exactly 
how much appeasing they need. It 
specifically excludes what is normally 
understood as an economic debate, a 
discussion of what is needed to provide 
the greatest good for the greatest many 
whose livelihood depends on this 
economy. It is assumed that avoiding 
junk status is the only rational goal 
of everyone who understands basic 
economics.
A very large section of this debate, 
particularly prominent in the media 
and among mainstream economic 
commentators, takes the argument one 
step further. It very specifically turns 
the cargo cult behind this thinking (a 
cargo cult is a 20th century belief by 
inhabitants of very isolated islands that 
the prosperity they enjoyed in World 
War Two would be restored if they 
performed the rituals needed to get 
the Americans to appear out of the sky 
again) into a very thinly veiled attempt 
to turn back decades of social progress.
Their story currently centres on the 
events of December, in which then 
Finance minister Nhlanhla Nene was 
fired. So angered were the agencies, 
and that other deity, the foreign 
investor, that they needed instantly 
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to be appeased. A heavy price was 
required to win them over – the only 
way to appease them was to dash 
onto the rocks progressive income tax 
(by raising VAT), a national minimum 
wage, national health insurance, the 
jobs of most public servants and the 
pay packets of the few who were left 
after the carnage. Anything less and the 
terror of junk status was inevitable.
It does not have to be this way. A 
downgrade to junk would obviously 
be a problem for the country – but it 
is not the kiss of death. It would make 
economic recovery more difficult 
but would not remotely rule it out. 
Nor, if it came to that, is avoiding a 
downgrade worth abandoning the 
first and most important principle of 
economic discussion mentioned earlier 
– that what we ought to be discussing is 
what this economy needs to grow and 
meet the needs of South Africans. In 
that discussion, the country’s grading 
in international markets is an important 
factor but it is just that – a factor. 
Similarly, we really need to stop talking 
about the markets and those who invest 
in them as South Africans do: whether 
in scorn on the left or reverence on 
the right and in the centre, they are 
treated as a machine when they are, 
in reality, the sum total of decisions 
by people with lots of money who are 
subject to the same prejudices and loss 
of judgement as other people.
This article will begin by discussing 
the lobby which wants to sacrifice 
working people and the poor because 
it is the most common, and at the 
moment most influential, form of the 
worship of supposedly unstoppable 
and inhuman forces which are in reality 
nothing of the sort. It will then try to 
show why we can do better – not only 
by rejecting demands to make the poor 
pay for politicians’ mistakes but also by 
refusing messages which tell us that we 
are forced by impersonal forces to do 
some things rather than others even if 
what needs to be done fits our needs 
rather than their desires. 
Never Waste a Good Crisis: 
December 9 and the Rich People’s 
Lobby 
Probably the most extreme case of 
the use of a small group of people from 
other countries to scare South Africans 
into submission is the rich person’s 
lobby which emerged after the sacking 
of former Finance minister Nene.
Oddly, while this lobby championed 
the rich, it does not seem to have 
been the work of rich people. While 
it is customary to assume that lobbies 
which speak on behalf of the affluent 
are doing the bidding of big business, 
there is no evidence that this lobby 
emerges out of business at all – it no 
doubt has its supporters in business 
but clearly also has its opponents too. 
It is particularly strong among right 
of centre economists, commentators 
and, in abundance, the media (on 
most economic policy issues, any 
difference between the view of 
right-wing economists and that of the 
media is entirely coincidental).  As 
indicated earlier, this lobby’s pitch 
centres around powerful and very 
angry foreigners who are deeply 
scarred by Nene’s dismissal and who 
must, therefore, be begged to forgive 
us for the President’s sin. Those who 
are to be sacrificed in order to appease 
these irate economic potentates are 
the poor, who usually lack the muscle 
to fight back. Fortunately, Finance 
minister Pravin Gordhan ignored them, 
of which more later. But the claim that 
we need to appease angry foreigners 
and that the only way we can do this is 
to cut government programmes which 
serve the poor is still very much with us 
and seems likely to remain so for a very 
long time.
The lobby is more interesting for 
what it tells us about the state of the 
economic debate than what it says 
about the economy (which is nothing 
at all since its claims are not backed 
by evidence or argument beyond the 
tired mantra that the markets must 
be obeyed).  It does not propose its 
preferred course of action because it is 
best for the economy but because it is 
imposed on it by two forces who are 
portrayed in an extremely misleading 
way – the ratings agencies and foreign 
investors. Both are portrayed as 
machine-like forces which must be 
obeyed if our economy is to grow. 
This line of thinking is very popular 
and looks quite neat in theory. Its only 
problem – besides the moral issue of 
blaming the weakest, rather than those 
who are most responsible, for problems 
– is that it is entirely wrong.
First, the agencies, whose mediocrity 
is forgotten amidst a religious awe 
which places them at the centre of the 
exercise of wisdom and power. On the 
wisdom front, their ratings are assumed 
to be the result of an entirely rational 
process in which highly skilled analysts 
interpret top quality data using criteria 
known openly to all. On power, 
the agencies are assumed, through 
their ratings, to be able to shape the 
economic future of nations, large and 
small. This reverential awe is usually 
bestowed only on those agencies based 
in the US or Europe, not those which 
originate from Japan and Korea. This is 
no surprise because the ratings of those 
agencies which are held in awe are the 
product of a highly subjective process 
in which the most important voices are 
not those of logic or evidence, but that 
of local business people, in particular 
bank economists. The idea that the 
agencies are academic institutions, 
filled with geeks who are simply 
interested in where the evidence takes 
them, is a quaint fiction. They are 
businesses and their decisions tend 
to reflect that reality far more than 
evidence or logic. 
Since 2008, the agencies have 
become far more negative about 
those they rate; this does not reflect 
worsening economic conditions – it 
means that they have become more 
negative than they used to be given the 
same set of figures. This has nothing to 
do with changes in actuarial science 
and everything to do with the fact that 
they made over-optimistic calls about 
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major companies (such as Lehman 
Brothers), have been threatened with 
legal action in the US because their 
incompetence allegedly cost investors 
lots of money, and are therefore 
frantically covering their backs in the 
hope of preventing a repetition.
Having spoken to the American 
and European agencies for several 
years, I became increasingly convinced 
that they were not very interested in 
evidence and argument. Coincidence 
presented me with a chance to test 
how interested they were. During 
one of their visits, I offered them 
research findings which contradicted 
a statement they had made. I offered 
to send them the findings and they 
agreed. It then occurred to me that 
simply handing over the research 
might turn out to be futile since I would 
have no way to check whether they 
bothered to consult it.  So I decided 
to wait to see whether they asked for 
it – as the Asian agencies had done in 
previous exchanges.  They did not – 
they showed no interest in the research 
at all. I then decided that I would not 
see them again since there is little value 
talking to people who have no interest 
in listening. This reached the ears of 
the media and I landed up on business 
television, debating the head of one of 
the agencies based here. The presenter 
asked me at one point what the agency 
could do to convince me that they 
were serious. I said the research was 
still available and the agency head was 
welcome to get it from me – I never 
heard from him.
If the initial incident could have 
simply been a case of busy people 
forgetting, the failure of a senior official 
to show willingness to consult evidence 
to which they did not have access in 
any other way, and which challenged 
their claims, surely shows bias. There 
is also hard evidence that the agencies 
take their lead from local business 
opinion – one local business person 
boasted in a private discussion that 
they had persuaded the agencies to 
downgrade this country in the hope of 
changing policy. So the local business 
people who warn repeatedly of what 
we have to do to please the agencies 
are really telling us what is needed to 
do to please them. The ratings agency 
attitudes of which they warn are 
actually their own attitudes – which 
they could, of course, change if they 
wanted.  
The Power of Exaggeration 
But, whatever you think of the 
agencies’ ethics or competence, don’t 
they exercise great power? Yes and 
no. It is true that the agencies wield 
entirely unjustified power not because 
their arguments convince anyone but 
because many companies’ systems are 
programmed in such a way that they 
automatically sell bonds or shares if a 
country or company is downgraded 
to non-investment level or ‘junk’ 
status. So it is preferable not to be 
downgraded: it does become more 
difficult to borrow money at interest 
rates which are affordable and it does 
commonly prompt capital outflows – 
money which leaves the country. The 
question, however, is whether meeting 
that fate is so damaging that just about 
any sacrifice is worth it to avoid being 
downgraded to ‘junk’. The emphatic 
answer is no. Most mainstream 
discussions about ‘junk’ status imply 
that it is a fate used for states with 
non-functioning economies. Even if it 
is conceded that some ‘junk’ countries 
have workable economies when they 
acquire this status, it is assumed that 
they don’t have them for very long after 
the downgrade – those who endure this 
fate, it is claimed, are usually forced to 
beg for IMF hand-outs and to hand 
over the management of the economy 
to the Fund’s bureaucrats. 
In fact, the list of economies which 
have experienced ‘junk’ status at one 
time or another includes Turkey, Brazil, 
South Korea and India. While some 
are currently in difficulty, others such 
as India are turning in growth rates 
of more than 7%. Certainly, none of 
them would be considered economic 
basket cases.  So a downgrade makes 
a country’s economic life more 
difficult – it does not end it. It is also 
worth mentioning that one frequently 
heard argument – that doing what the 
agencies are presumed to want is vital 
if we are not to lose our sovereignty 
to the IMF – is a little odd because 
it argues, in effect, that we should 
give up our sovereignty to ratings 
agencies to avoid giving it up to the 
IMF. Finally, and most importantly, 
people who know the financial 
markets will tell you that the capital 
outflows which are predicted to flow 
from a downgrade here have already 
happened as a reaction to December 
9. So a significant part of what we are 
supposed to be preventing has already 
happened – and we are still here, even 
if our economy is in a poor state.
All of this suggests that, if it is 
possible to please the agencies in a 
way which does not impose severe 
costs on the economy, this is worth 
doing. But, if doing so means damaging 
ourselves, it is surely better to endure 
the downgrade. It also means that, 
whatever the agencies do, our 
prospects of resuming growth depend 
on relations between government and 
local business, not in finding the (non-
existent) magic formula for appeasing 
the agencies.  And, since much of what 
the mainstream commentators fear has 
already happened, the really important 
impact of a downgrade to ‘junk’ may 
be political, not economic. If this 
country is a guide, the real function of 
ratings agencies is not to pass credible 
judgments but to play into domestic 
politics. Until now, they have been 
used to force the government to make 
changes which many in positions of 
authority would prefer not to make – 
it has been an important lever nudging 
policy and practice in particular 
directions. But what if the country is 
downgraded to junk (which seems 
likely)?
The lever will then, of course, 
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have been stripped of its power – a 
downgrade may then be used to 
achieve precisely the opposite purpose 
to that for which it has been used up 
to now. It could be argued then that, 
seeing that we have already been 
downgraded to ‘junk’, we have no 
reason to pay any more attention to 
what the agencies and their allies think. 
More dangerously for the country, it 
could be used to discredit Gordhan 
and the Treasury – it will be said that 
they failed to prevent a downgrade 
and should therefore be replaced by 
someone more competent, such as a 
politically connected back bencher. 
The irony of using ratings to impose 
policy approaches is that the threat 
of a downgrade works. But actually 
downgrading to junk could deprive the 
downgrade of its power – and might 
actually achieve precisely the opposite 
of the stated intention by freeing those 
who want to endanger the economy 
from the constraints imposed by the 
rating. There is only one way to make 
this very unlikely – to persuade the key 
interests in the economy that life does 
not end with a downgrade and that the 
same considerations which prompted 
an alliance in the cities to demand a 
credible finance minister would apply 
if the economy is downgraded to 
‘junk’.  
An equally misleading aspect of this 
argument is the message it sends on 
foreign investors. Again, the impression 
is created here that we are dealing with 
an entirely machine-like force which 
we have no power to influence. In 
reality, foreign investors are even more 
likely to be influenced by local business 
people than the ratings agencies. This 
flows from a common sense reality. If 
foreigners are considering a significant 
investment, the people they are most 
likely to consult are local business 
people – so again, since it seems 
reasonable to assume that foreign 
investors will be heavily influenced by 
what their local peers say, again what 
is passed off as foreign opinion is really 
local sentiment. Much of what we read 
about investment is also based on a 
fallacy – that investors invest when 
countries tick a check list of economic 
correctness and political pliability. In 
reality, investors base their decisions 
on the only issue which matters to 
them – will they make money? This 
depends not on meeting check lists 
but on whether the economy is 
doing well enough to generate yields 
on investment – and that depends 
on whether local investment has 
been stimulating growth. Here and 
everywhere, the key to growth is local 
investors – foreigners come in if the 
economy is already growing, they do 
not make it grow in the first place.
In both cases, then, what is 
presented as a discussion about 
what foreigners think is really about 
what locals in business think. Many 
lessons flow from this but the one 
most relevant in this discussion is 
that economic policy debate takes us 
forward only when it focuses on what is 
needed to grow our economy in a way 
which includes many more people. 
Central to this is a discussion between 
South African economic interests, what 
they want and what they are willing to 
compromise to get it. What the ratings 
agencies or the ‘foreign investor’ think 
is far less important than what the 
country needs, whatever the people 
from elsewhere do.  
The 2016 Budget: A way forward?
It is surely not reading too much 
into this year’s budget to argue that 
it adopted, broadly, the approach 
recommended here.
Gordhan and his team were clearly 
under pressure to use the budget 
to sacrifice the poor on the altar of 
politicians’ mistakes. They decided 
not to listen and so the budget avoids 
the dramatic pro-market measures 
which the economic correctness 
lobby demanded. On the other hand, 
Treasury did take seriously the views of 
business, with whom it had been talking 
in the period just before the budget 
in an attempt to restore confidence. 
And so the budget proposed not an 
assault on any one interest group 
but a partnership approach in which 
the major economic actors worked 
together, motivated by a common 
interest in growth. While labour is not 
currently in a fit state to participate 
effectively, the door has been left open 
for it to do this as and when it feels 
ready. 
This clearly is an approach which 
gives priority to the country’s need 
for growth over the next few decades 
over the demand for a quick fix 
which would have won glowing 
media approval, excited those who 
adore the agencies, and created so 
much conflict and so many barriers to 
opening the economy to the talents 
and energies of many who have been 
excluded thus far that it would, in not 
too long a time, have wiped out all 
the pluses and would have created a 
set of new minuses far more than a 
downgrade. 
Whether the approach will work is 
an important discussion but one which 
is too complicated to be squeezed into 
an analysis of broader issues. At this 
point, the crucial issue to remember, 
which the budget’s framers seem to 
have understood, is that the verdicts 
of the ratings agencies are only one 
of a range of factors which need to 
be considered when government 
and private interests discuss how to 
boost growth in a way which includes 
many more people than are now part 
of the economic mainstream. What 
government, business and labour have 
been doing needs to change and so 
there are good reasons for reform, 
whatever the agencies say. But all the 
major interests will move us forward 
only if they devote far more time to 
what they need to do to relate more 
effectively to each other than on how 
to appease those supposedly all-
powerful ratings businesses from across 
the water. ■
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